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ABSTRACT
Over the recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that macro prudential policies 
are not only considered to be “a missing ingredient from the current policy framework”, but 
that there has also been “too huge a gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of 
individual financial institutions.”
The link between monetary policy and macro prudential policies, the knowledge of central 
banks in matters relating to information on market conditions and their oversight of payment 
systems, as well as the need to bridge the existing gap between supervisory authorities and 
central banks whilst executing their supervisory roles and functions, have necessitated an 
extension of central banks role in the management of liquidity risks and macro prudential 
supervision.
A fundamental aim of this paper is to address how an extension of central banks’ roles in 
macro prudential supervision can assist regulators and supervisors in bridging the afore 
mentioned gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of individual financial 
institutions. In so doing, the need for greater focus on macro prudential factors, namely, the 
system as a whole, as opposed to mere focus on the supervision of individual institutions will 
be highlighted. The expertise and knowledge with which a central bank is endowed in its role 
as overseer of the entire payments system – as well as the quality of information which it has 
access to, are some of those factors which add weight to its ability to bridge “the gap”.
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The Increased Impact of Macro Prudential Supervision
Prudential supervision which is carried out at macro level is distinguished from that which is 
carried out at micro level in the sense that micro prudential supervision restricts itself to 
individual firms whilst macro prudential supervision operates on a system wide basis. Pro 
cyclical effects which have been generated through Basel II internal credit risk models (which 
relate   to   the   fact   banks’  internal   credit   risk   models   were   overly   sensitive   in   their 
implementation
2 for the calculation of regulatory capital) – along with the need to address 
systemic risks in a more efficient manner, are amongst some of the reasons attributed to why 
greater emphasis on prudential supervision at macro level is of vital importance.
The concept “macro prudential” can be defined as “policy which focuses on the financial 
system as a whole, and also treats aggregate risk as endogenous with regard to the collective 
behaviour of institutions.”
3
One principal aspect of macro prudential supervision and regulation, as reflected by Basel III, 
is the fact that it provides for a consideration of the build up of systemic risks over time – 
particularly pro cyclical effects generated within the financial sector.
Over the recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that macro prudential policies 
are not only considered to be “a missing ingredient from the current policy framework”, but 
that there has also been “too huge a gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of 
individual financial institutions.”
4
1Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen and Oxford Brookes University, Oxford. 
Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2 In their implementation to facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine 
the level of capital which large banks must retain.”
3 E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 
6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes 
and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 2 
http://www.ephilipdavis.com/macroprudential_regulation[1].pdf
4 Please also refer to abstract;  See Bank of England, Executive Summary “Role of Macro Prudential Policy” 
Discussion Paper November 2009  at page 3 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdfB. An Extension of the Traditional Roles of Central Banks
Traditional Roles of Central Banks
1) Lender of Last Resort Arrangements
The need for the creation of bridge banks and a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) was 
brought to light following numerous related proposals which were put forward following the 
financial woes of banks such as Northern Rock and Hypo Real Estate.
5
One of the weaknesses of central banks which was revealed during the Financial Crisis was 
the inability of the Bank of England to perform its traditional role as lender of last resort for a 
limited period of time (without such a role being made public) – which created problems that 
triggered the run on Northern Rock.
Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the 
latter stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly 
for longer periods of maturity and intervention in selected credit markets.
6
2)Oversight of payment systems
Furthermore, as observed by Hannoun
7, central banks are increasingly being put in charge of 
overseeing systemic risk. Such an innovative role can be considered to be an extension of 
their traditional role as overseers of payment systems. Hannoun goes on to attribute the 
delegation of such responsibility for the oversight of systemic risk as owing to their unique 
positions as ultimate providers of liquidity – which places them in a such a formidable stance 
to focus on system wide risks (as well as obtaining an integrated view of both the individual 
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole).
8
In addition to their unique position as ultimate providers of liquidity, the extensive knowledge 
possessed by central banks – such knowledge and expertise being attributed to their role as 
overseers of payment systems, their means of acquiring such knowledge and expertise, places 
them in a formidable position in matters relating to the responsibility for macro prudential 
supervision.
Two examples have been put forward to bolster the argument that “the macro prudential 
approach to supervision should take into consideration the fact that, even when financial 
institutions appear to be strong on an individual basis, systemic risk could still emerge as a 
result of the interconnectedness of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures” - such 
examples being the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the proposed 
Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States.
9 
5 For further information on bridge banks and means whereby ailing banks could efficiently be relieved of their 
assets, see D Schäfer and KF Zimmerman, “Bad Bank (s) and Re capitalization of the Banking Sector” (2009) 
Discussion Paper 897 of DIW Berlin <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3656>
6 “Such a measure being aimed at supporting secondary market liquidity and the outright purchase of bonds”. 
See H Hannoun, “The Expanding Role of Central Banks Since the Crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 3
7 see ibid
8 ibid
9 ibidThe Role of Central Banks in Managing Liquidity
10 Risks 
As well as highlighting the need to address the question on how much maturity transformation 
is needed – in matters relating to maturity transformation and liquidity risks, it is argued that 
“maturity transformation is one of those areas which we rely on the banking system to 
perform   and   that   since   there   may   never   be   enough   short-term   liabilities   issued   by 
governments and the private sector (to satisfy the demand for liquid short-term savings 
instruments), that the primary function of banks in providing these vehicles to the public, 
should be welcomed.”
11
The likelihood that banks are exposed to significant levels of liquidity risks arises from the 
nature of commercial banks’ business, namely, the fact that such business involves, to a 
fundamental extent, maturity transformation.
The provision of central bank reserves account serves as a means whereby commercial banks 
are able to manage their liquidity risk – through a process which enables them to meet their 
“ordinary payment needs – including normal intra day variations.”
12
C. Macro Prudential Supervision and Basel III
Under its macro prudential overlay and its efforts to address stability over time (pro 
cyclicality), one of those initiatives highlighted under the Basel III framework includes 
counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning.
Progress made with Counter Cyclical Measures in Various Jurisdictions
According to Brunnermeier et al, counter cyclical measures should be applied on a country 
specific basis since cycles are not identical across several jurisdictions around the world.
13 In 
their opinion, it is yet too early to talk about a “global cycle” since “credit expansion has 
taken place at a very different pace in various countries.”
14 As observed by Caprio Jr, even 
though
15 no country thus far had adopted a counter cyclical capital requirement policy, as 
recommended by Brunnermeier et al, a few have adopted counter cyclical provisioning – 
10 “Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses.” See Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
11 See S Cecchetti, „Financial Reform: A Progress Report“ Remarks prepared for the Westminster Economic 
Forum, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, October 2010 at page 4 of 6 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101004.htm
12  Maturity transformation is evident within the banking system and day to day business operations since 
“customer deposits may be available for instant withdrawals while bank lending to corporations and households 
tends to be committed, potentially for many years.” See P Fisher, „Managing Liquidity in the System – the 
Bank’s Liquidity Insurance Operations“ at page 2 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101004e.pdf>
13 See M Brunnermeier et al, “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy, 11< http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf> at page 37 (page 55 of 
98)
14 In this respect, they illustrate with the example that Germany and Italy did not share in the housing cycle that 
affected the USA, UK, Spain etc. See ibid
15 As of February 2010Spain being the first to implement such, followed by Colombia and much more recently, 
Peru.
16
Measures aimed at “building up reserves over the cycle which might be part of regulatory 
capital or separate from it and which would amount to 2 – 3 % of risk weighted assets at the 
peak of a boom” have been proposed in the UK by its financial services regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority.
17 Other measures of counter cyclical regulation which are being 
considered   by   other   jurisdictions   (and   which   would   “limit   the   scope   under   Basel   2 
arrangements for banks to assess their own risk by providing a one-size fits all ceiling and 
may be beneficial in making regulation more transparent)
18 could include “an overall leverage 
ratio of capital to unadjusted assets (rather than risk weighted assets).”
19
Dynamic Provisioning
Whilst   the   principles   of   the   Spanish   Dynamic   Provision   Mechanism   are   lauded   by 
Brunnermeier et al, its “quantitative effect” is not considered by them to have had a moderate 
effect on the credit cycle – to the same extent as their proposed mechanism. Its universal 
adoption
20, is however, considered to represent a “ counter- cyclical- lite” in the case where 
their proposal (Brunnermeier et al’s proposal) is considered as being too radical.
Why Central Banks Assume Such a Crucial Role Given the Present Framework of Basel III
In its present form, Basel III accords much pre eminence to the need for macro prudential 
supervision – as well as a macro prudential framework.
Central banks, it is argued, have a key role to play in establishing such a macro prudential 
framework – as well as a role in macro prudential supervision and regulation for the following 
reasons:
21
- Developing and structuring macro prudential measures requires reliable analytical and 
forecasting skills – for instance, with regard to the overall economy or specific market 
segments. Central banks have extensive and soundly based knowledge of these fields.
16 See G Caprio Jr, “Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Counter cyclical Regulatory Requirements” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5198, The World Bank Development Research Group, Finance and 
Private Sector Development Team, February 2010 at page 11
17 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at 
the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled 
„Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 10 and also 
Financial Services Authority, “The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global banking Crisis” FSA 
Publications 2009
18 Although it is added that “it is essential that such ceiling applies to all relevant assets and does not encourage 
banks to use off-balance structures to evade such a ceiling” See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential 
Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy 
Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial 
Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 10
19 ibid
20 „Including the adjustment of IFRS to allow that to occur”
21 TJ Jordan, „A Changing Role for Central Banks ?“ Speech by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman of the 
Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Welcome Event Master of Banking and Finance, St. Gallen, 
22 September 2010, page 4
http://www.bis.org/review/r100924b.pdf- Macro prudential policy interacts closely with monetary policy – which implies that 
information   advantage   of   central   banks   could   be   important   in   shaping   macro 
prudential measures
We may then infer that central banks' crucial roles in establishing a macro prudential 
framework provide the key to bridging the  gap between macro economic policy and the 
regulation of individual financial institutions. This however, on its own, is insufficient – close 
collaboration   and   effective   information   sharing   between   central   banks   and   regulatory 
authorities is paramount. Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management 
and Supervision
22 consolidates on this argument.
Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision
23 
elaborates on how cooperation and information sharing between relevant public authorities 
(including   bank   supervisors,   central   banks   and   securities   regulators)   can   contribute 
significantly to the effectiveness of the roles assumed by these authorities.
Such communication will not only facilitate a process where:
24
- supervisors are able to improve their assessments of the overall profile of a bank and 
the risks it faces (and help other authorities assess the risks presented to the broader 
financial system); but also
- Assist supervisors in informing central banks of their judgement regarding the range 
of liquidity risks faced by firms (for which they are responsible) while central banks 
may help supervisors deepen their understanding of the current financial market 
environment and risks to the financial system as a whole
Central banks’ knowledge of information on market conditions could also be beneficial for 
supervisors in their assessment of the “appropriateness of assumptions made by banks in 
stress test scenarios and contingency funding plans.”
25 Furthermore, in their role as overseers 
of the payment and settlement system, central banks are able to assist supervisors in 
“deepening their understanding of the linkages between institutions and the potential for 
disruptions to spread across the financial system.”
26
In addition to the general practice undertaken by central banks - which involves the 
implementation of frequent “Financial Stability Reviews” which are aimed at evaluating the 
outlook for financial stability, “the initial policy objectives” of macro prudential regulation, 
according to Davis and Karim include the early identification of potential vulnerabilities and 
the encouragement of such financial institutions to undertake stress testing (this being 
facilitated through the public reporting which is carried out by financial institutions).
27
22 See Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision” paragraph 144, at page 34 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
23 ibid
24 see ibid at page 35
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at 
the 6
th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12
th June 2009, entitled 
“Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What Lessons for EU Countries?” see particularly 
pages 10 and 11 
http://www.euroframe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/euroframe/docs/2009/EUROF09_macroprudential_regulation.
pdfThe previous section focussed on the importance of information sharing and communication 
between central banks and regulatory agencies. Desirable qualities of such information 
exchanges and communicative links include timeliness, accuracy and completeness of the 
information being communicated. As well as information sharing and communication, other 
aspects which cannot be addressed comprehensively here relate to moral hazard
28  and 
information asymmetry
29 and particularly, the need to address consequences of excessive risk 
taking incentives.
D. Re delineating Duties and Roles of Central Banks and Supervisory Agencies in 
Matters relating to Regulation and Supervision
As was highlighted in a previous paper,
30 even though the aftermath of the recent Financial 
Crises is likely to witness the era of more prominent roles being transferred to central banks 
across   several   jurisdictions,   a   fundamental   change   and   re-definition   in   roles   and 
responsibilities between national supervisors and central banks is expected in the United 
Kingdom – as compared to jurisdictions such as Germany and the United States.
31
The Banking Reform Act in the UK, not only provides the Bank of England with “ a legal 
objective to contribute to protecting and enhancing the stability of the financial systems of the 
UK but also formalises the Bank of England’s role in the supervision of payment systems.”
32 
The ability of the Bank to request data from banks through the regulator, the FSA, as 
compared to the present situation where the FSA is only able to collect data it requires itself, 
is considered to be “an important innovation”
33 under the Act. These arrangements under the 
Act are also considered to be an important and vital means whereby the Bank is able to 
acquire “more detailed understanding of developments about the banking system.”
34
„On 19 November 2009 the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the Financial Services 
Bill into Parliament. The Bill, which reforms financial services regulation and contains 
provisions to improve redress for consumers, and financial education and awareness, received 
Royal Assent on 8 April 2010. The Act includes:
35
28 For further information on the need to address moral hazard, exit strategies – as well as the provision by 
governments of incentives to financial institutions (as a means of preventing them from depending on 
government support once the economy begins to recover), see J Rodriguez-Miguez and M Ojo, “Juridical and 
Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of 
Financial Crisis” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646320>
29For further information on information asymmetry and the role of governments and central banks in regulation, 
see M Ojo, The Need for Government and Central Bank Intervention in Financial Regulation: Free Banking and 
the Challenges of Information Uncertainty http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624918
30 See J Rodriguez - Miguez and M Ojo, “Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation 
and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crisis” 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646320>
31 ibid
32 E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at the 6
th 
Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12
th June 2009, entitled “Causes and 




35HM Treasury, „Financial Services Act“ http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_bill_index.htm- A new statutory financial stability objective for the Financial Services Authority (FSA);
- A new independent consumer financial education body, established by the FSA; 
- Provision for regulations on remuneration transparency, and a duty for the FSA to make rules on 
remuneration;
- A duty for the FSA to make rules requiring firms to produce recovery and resolution plans (also known 
as “living wills”); 
- Power for the FSA to ban short selling of certain instruments, and establish a permanent disclosure 
regime; and 
Greater disciplinary powers for the FSA, including earlier disclosure of investigations.“
The new statutory duty conferred on the UK’s financial services regulator (the FSA), namely, 
the new financial stability objective, is aimed at reinforcing the FSA’s international focus.
36 
Such an aim required not only “a consideration of the importance of re affirming the roles of 
the Treasury, Bank of England and the FSA, but also the need to establish mechanisms which 
would help ensure that the tripartite authorities speak with a common voice in international 
fora.”
37  Of paramount importance is the expectation that such a statutory duty would 
complement the Government and the Bank of England’s responsibility.
38
Hence whilst, greater powers have been transferred to the Bank of England
39, the FSA has 
also acquired a new statutory duty – in addition to the previous four statutory objectives.
E. Need For Central Bank Independence From Political Interference
One vital reason attributed to the need for Government intervention to correct market failure, 
it is argued, arises from the fact that “market participants cannot manage systemic risks if left 
to their own devices.”
40  This also constitutes a need for macro prudential supervision. 
However, the question relating to the level of macro prudential oversight to be delegated to 
central banks and the degree of Government intervention also needs to be addressed. Whilst 
the flaws inherent within the tripartite authorities in the UK (the Treasury, Bank and FSA) 
during Northern Rock crisis include the failure to promptly detect and adequately monitor 
risks to system as a whole , and such a flaw could be addressed given the central bank’s 
ability (via its intervention) to provide invaluable source of liquidity funding in terms of 
timeliness, collaboration between the Government and the central bank should not be so close 
that such proximity would influence central bank’s monetary setting policies. The level of 
independence required between central banks and their governments (to facilitate effective 
working relationships) would depend on institutional settings – as well as country specific 
circumstances. 
36 See HM Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets July 2009 at page 99
37 „“Whilst continuing to give adequate attention to regulatory debates” ibid
38 ibid
39 As well as responsibility for systemic oversight, the grant of further supplementary oversight functions to the 
Bank of England, it is further argued, will be desirable. For further information on this, see Shearman and 
Sterling LLP, “UK Government Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform” June 2010 and Treasury Select 
Committee, “Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision_ Macro prudential Supervision” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/76707.htm
40 See Statement of Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Treasury Select Committee, 
“Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision_ Macro prudential Supervision” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/76707.htmii. Need for Adequate Balance Between Rules and Discretion in Designing an Effective 
Macro prudential Regime.
Be it a rules- based scheme which stipulates that banks should build up buffers of general 
provisions,
41  capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers, or a principles based 
regime (in which a considerable degree of judgment and discretion will be exercised), “any 
macroprudential policy framework should seek to be credible, with policy decisions applied 
consistently and systemically. To be consistent over time, a regime needs to be robust to 
uncertainty and unforeseen events.”
42
Conclusion
The aftermath of the recent Financial Crisis has witnessed an extension in the roles and 
responsibilities of central banks across several jurisdictions. Such an extension embraces 
increased responsibilities for the oversight of systemic risks - as well as the formalisation of 
responsibilities for the oversight of payment systems. An extension of the central bank's role 
in macroprudential supervision is not only required because of the expertise and knowledge 
possessed   by   central   banks   in   areas   relating   to   the   development   and   structuring   of 
macroprudential measures (which requires reliable and analytical forecasting skills), or 
because   the   information   advantage   of   central   banks   could   be   important   in   shaping 
macroprudential meaures, but because close and effective collaboration between supervisors 
and central banks, particularly pursuant to Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision, could help bridge the  gap between macro economic 
policy and the regulation of individual financial institutions.
41Such as that of the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Model; such a model „requires banks to build up buffers of 
general provisions against performing loans during periods of upturns – which could then be drawn from during 
recessive turns“ see Bank of England, „Role of Macroprudential Policy“ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudential091121.pdf> 
Discussion Paper November 2009 at page 8
42See ibid at page 27REFERENCES
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